COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS: DISREGARD OF THE
CORPORATE ENTITY FOR THE
BENEFIT OF SHAREHOLDERS
UNLIKE THE corporate creditor, the shareholder who attempts to
persuade a court to disregard the corporation's status as a separate
legal entity will find few black-letter rules by which he can evaluate
his chances of success.' An analysis of the cases in which these
attempts have been made may help to fill the gap left by the failure
of the courts to articulate generally applicable rules.
PROTECTION OF THE SHAREHOLDER

Three situations will be discussed here in which disregard of
the corporate entity for the benefit of the shareholder has been
found necessary by the courts to properly adjust the equities between the parties to a suit.2

The factual contexts involved are

widely divergent. The entity has been disregarded to prevent
avoidance of contractual obligations by the shareholder's adversary.
In other cases, the corporate form has been ignored by the court on
policy grounds to extend to a shareholder the protection afforded
by a particular state statute. On a few occasions, courts have disre:garded the corporate entity to enable the shareholder to avoid fed,eral income taxes.
.ContractualObligations
The law of contracts attempts to insure realization of the reasonable expectations which have been induced by the making of
-a promise.3 In order to prevent a party from manipulating the
'corporate form to his own advantage in violation of this basic prin' On the general topic of disregarding the corporate entity see BALLANTINE, COR(rev. ed. 1946); FLETCIER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 41-46 (rev.
& perm. ed. 1931); WopIsER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATE PROBLEMS 1-85 (1927).
2A few courts have held, or at least implied, that the corporate entity may never
be disregarded to benefit a shareholder. See Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491
(D.C. Cir. 1950); In re Sun Cab Co., 67 F. Supp. 137 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Eastwood Model
Mkt. v. State, 359 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 379
Pa. 38, 108 A.2d 336 (1954) (dissent).
See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1 (1950).
3PORATIONS §§ 118-142
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ciple of the law, courts have been willing to disregard the corporate
entity.4 Epstein v. Fabricraft5 represents a line of cases involving
disregard for that purpose at the request and for the benefit of a
shareholder. 6
In the Epstein case a landlord attempted to expel his tenant on
the grounds that the tenant had violated the lease contract by subletting the premises to an affiliated corporation. The court, however, disregarded the separate entity of the subtenant, holding that
since all of the stock of both tenant and subtenant was owned by one
1
person, the premises were in fact still occupied by the same party.
There had therefore been no violation of the lease and the landlord
could not prevail.
The approach demonstrated by the Epstein case does not unfairly prejudice lessors. A subleasing arrangement does not relieve
the original tenant of liability for failure to perform any of the
covenants in the lease, including the usual promise to pay rent.8
Further, the tenant in some jurisdictions is liable to the landlord
for any waste committed by his subtenant.9 Even if under local
law such liability will not be imposed, and the subtenant is judgment-proof, the court can again deny the subtenant's status as a
separate legal entity to impose liability on the controlling shareholder.10 In short, that pool of assets originally available to a landlord under a lease contract will still be available after the sublease.
This being the case, the shareholder's expectation of successfully
transferring possession of the leased premises to the corporate sub'See

Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Dairy Co-Operative Ass'n v. Brandis

Creamery, 147 Ore. 488, 30 P.2d 338 (1934); Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt
Co., 147 Cal. 263, 81 Pac. 1070 (1905); LATr5N, CORPORATIONs 76-78 (1959). But see
Berry v. Old South Engraving Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N.E. 601 (1933).
67 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
'See also Crossman v. Fontanbleau Hotel Corp., 273 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1959);
Tinkoff v. Poddin, 337 Ill. App. 385, 85 N.E.2d 855 (1949); Earp v. Schmidt, 334 Ill.
App. 382, 79 N.E.2d 637 (1948). But see Brighton Packing Co. v. Butcher's Slaughtering g: Melting Ass'n, 211 Mass. 398, 97 N.E. 780 (1912).
7 67 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
8 Braswell v. Shurling, 87 Ga. App. 724, 75 S.E.2d 213 (1953); Carlton Chambers
Co. v. Trask, 26 Mass. 264, 158 N.E. 786 (1927); Brosnan v. Kramer, 135 Cal. 36, 66
Pac. 979 (1901); Bless v. Jenkins, 129 Mo. 647, 31 S.W. 938 (1895).
' Winans v. Valentine, 152 Ore. 462, 54 P.2d 106 (1936); Dix v. Jaquay, 94 App. Div.
554, 88 N.Y. Supp. 228 (1904).
20 Perhaps on grounds of inadequate capitalization.
See Minton v. Cavaney, 56
Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473 (1961); Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi 9- Baggage Co.,
178 Okla. 15, 61 P.2d 645 (1936). At any rate there had been no waste in the Epstein
case and none was threatened. The court noted that there had been no change in
the type or amount of equipment located on the premises, and that there had been
no increase in the number of employees using the premises. 67 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
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tenant is not unreasonable. The courts will effectuate that expecta.
tion by disregarding the entity for the shareholder's benefit.1 A
contrary result would permit the landlord to avoid a contractual
obligation on a mere technicality.
Usury Statutes
In sharp contrast to the cases discussed above is a line of authority
permitting disregard of the corporate entity to benefit the shareholder even though that procedure actually defeats the expectations
of the parties to a contract. In some states the protection afforded
2
by the local usury statute is not extended to corporate borrowers.1
Frequently, a lender will attempt to circumvent the usury laws
as they relate to individual borrowers by requiring prospective
debtors to incorporate and then making the loan to the corporation
at an usurious rate of interest. If a suit is subsequently brought on
the debt, the individual shareholder will defend, of course, on the
ground that the court should look behind the corporation and view
the shareholder as the real debtor. Several courts have accepted
this argument and have allowed the shareholder to raise the defense
of usury where they were convinced that the loan was in fact made
to the individual, and that the corporation was formed and used
1

2For other decisions in which courts have disregarded the corporate entity for
the benefit of a shareholder in order to enforce a contract in the light of the reasonable expectations of the parties, see Crossman v. Fontanbleau Hotel Corp., 273
F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1959); Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley, 379 Pa. 38, 108 A.2d 336 (1954)
(3-3 decision); Tinkoff v. Poddin, 337 I1. App. 384, 85 N.E.2d 855 (1949); Earp v.
Schmidt, 334 I1. App. 382, 79 N.E.2d 637 (1948); Montgomery v. Central Natl Bank
& Trust Co., 267 Mich. 142, 255 N.W.2d 274 (1934). But see, White v. Evans, 117 N.J.
Eq. 1, 174 Atl. 731, reversing, 115 N.J. Eq. 177, 169 AtI. 812 (1934). In the White case,
defendant Evans had insured his farm against loss by fire, and subsequently conveyed
the premises to the "W.C. Evans Co.," his wholly owned corporation, to defeat his
wife's right of dower. The property was destroyed by fire and the insurance company was permitted to escape liability under a clause in the policy providing that
"this entire policy . . . shall be void . . . if any change . . . takes place in the
interest, title or possession of the subject of the insurance .... ." 115 N.J. Eq. at 2,
174 Ati. at 732. The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to disregard the corporate
entity for stockholder Evans' benefit. Id. The lower court in deciding for Evans had
stressed that insofar as the fire hazard was concerned, the insurance company had not
been subjected to any greater risk of loss as a result of the change in title. 115 N.J.
Eq. at 183, 169 AtI. at 815.
12 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2306 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.02 (Supp. 1962)
(permitting a rate 5% higher when the loan is made to a corporation); MD. ANN.
§ 125 (1957); MiCH. CoMP. LAws § 450.78 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.060
(1952); N.J. Rav. STAT. § 31:1-6 (1937); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 874.1; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1702.37 (Supp. 1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 2 (1954); S.C. CODE § 8-8 (1962>
CODE art. 23,

(restricted to corporations having an issued capital stock of $40,000 or above); VA. Cona
§ 6-351 (1950); W. VA. CODE § 4632 (1961).

ANN.
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solely for the purpose of avoiding the local usury statute. 13

These

courts apparently have been motivated by what they view as a strong
local policy adverse to usury. Thus, in Lesser v. Strubbe,'4 a New
Jersey court recently asserted that, "the mere use of the corporate
form cannot be permitted to obscure the true facts and sanction the
exaction of usury ...in disregard of our public policy against it."' 5
The expectations of the creditor derived from the loan contract
are regarded as subordinate to that policy. 16
Early New York decisions generally granted the shareholder
relief where it was shown that the lender was manipulating corporate entities to exact usurious rates of interest.1 However, since
the decision in Jenkins v. Moyse' 8 in 1930 the New York courts have
consistently held that the defense of usury may not be pleaded even

though the lender compelled the formation of the corporation for
11Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654 (1952); Lesser v. Strubbe,
56 N.J. Super. 274, 152 A.2d 409 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 67 NJ. Super. 537,
171 A.2d 114 (App. Div. 1961); Gilbert v. Doris R. Corp., 111 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1959). See
In re Greenburg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956) ; Engert v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
835 Ill. App. 566, 82 N.E.2d 63 (1948). But the defense is not available to the shareholder and the entity cannot be disregarded if the loan is actually made to and for the
benefit of the corporation. Feller v. Architect's Display Bldg., Inc., 54 N.J. Super. 205,
148 A.2d 634 (Ch. 1959); Corradini v. V. & M. Holding Corp., 34 N.J. Super. 727, 112
A.2d 603 (Ch. 1955).
"56 N.J. Super. 274, 152 A.2d 409 (Ch. 1959).
1 56 N.J. Super. at 285, 152 A.2d at 415.
10 Policy considerations implicit in other types of legislation have caused courts in
some cases to refuse to disregard the entity for the benefit of the shareholder. In point
are cases which arose during the severe postwar housing shortage under statutes and
regulations restricting the right of a landlord to evict his tenant at the expiration of
the lease. Viewing these acts as the products of a public emergency, the courts construed their provisions strictly, holding (1) that a corporate landlord was ineligible
to bring suit under the statutes to remove its tenant and (2) that the corporate entity
would not be disregarded at the behest of a shareholder in a corporate landlord where
the effect would be to sanction an eviction. For example, one requirement of these
statutes was that the landlord have full legal title to the premises in question; where
petitioner had paid the price of the building and had operated it, he was denied
relief when the court discovered that he had recorded legal title to the premises in
the name of his wholly owned corporation. The court expressly refused to disregard
the corporate entity. Nathan Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Moglen, 185 Misc. 657, 57
N.Y.S.2d 395 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 185 Misc. 831, 58 N.Y.S.2d 714 (Sup.
Ct. 1945). Accord, Goldberg v. Friedman, 186 Misc. 983, 61 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y.C. Munic.
Ct. 1946); Ditmars Homes, Inc. v. Logerfo, 188 Misc. 286, 67 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y.C.
Munic. Ct. 1946). Reconstruction Syndicate v. Sharpe, 186 Misc. 897, 61 N.Y.S.2d 176
Munic. Ct. 1946).
(N.Y.C.
27 Anam Realty Co. v. Delancey Garage, Inc., 190 App. Div. 745, 180 N.Y. Supp.
297 (1920); First Nat'l Bank v. American Near East & Black Sea Line, Inc., 119 Misc.
650, 197 N.Y. Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Arona Holding Corp. v. West 25th St. Realty
Corp., 198 N.Y. Supp. 660 (N.Y. City Ct. 1923).
Is 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
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the express purpose of avoiding the usury statute.10 These courts
point out that the shareholder has generally entered into the transaction with his eyes open, knowing the significance of incorporation.
Further, while conceding that the corporate entity may be disregarded in order to prevent the evasion of statutory restrictions, the
New York courts find, in the conduct of the lender, full compliance
with the law. Jenkins v. Moyse was explicit on this point:
Here the corporate entity has been created because the statute permits a
corporate entity to make a contract which would be illegal if made by
an individual. The law has not been evaded but followed meticulously
a result which all parties desired and which the
in order to accomplish
20
law does not forbid.
In fact, however, the Jenkins doctrine relieves all but the unsophisticated creditor from the ambit of New York usury prohibitions, and
effectively strips from the typically hard-pressed borrower the pro21
tection the statutes are designed to provide.
Taxation
Despite an overwhelming volume of adverse precedent, 22 shareholders have persisted in attempts to have the corporate entity disregarded in order to gain an otherwise unavailable tax benefit.
Under the doctrine of Moline Properties v. Commissioner,28 the
individual stockholder can persuade the court to disregard the corporate entity for income tax purposes only if he can show that it was
19 Werger v. Haines Corp., 277 App. Div. 1108, 101 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1950), aff'd, 802
N.Y. 930, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951); Metz v. Taglieri, 29 Misc. 2d 841, 215 N.Y.S.2d 268
(Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Rosen v. Columbia Savings & Loan Ass'n, 29 Misc. 2d 829, 218 N.Y.S.2d
765 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Bloom v. Hardwick's Hilltop, Inc., 19 Misc. 2d 758, 185 N.Y.S.2d
877 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Mittman v. Kuo, 5 Misc. 2d 595, 160 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Kings Mercantile Co. v. Cooper, 199 Misc. 381, 100 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1950). See
38 CORNELL L.Q. 93 (1952); 30 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 126 (1955); 7 U. MIAmI L. Rxv 875
(1953).
20 254 N.Y. at 324, 172 N.E. at 522.

22 The New York legislature, apparently recognizing that Jenkins had opened the
door to "unjust, unfair ...

and uneconomic practices ...

by money lenders using the

corporate device to accomplish the exaction of oppressive and usurious rates of interest" (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 968, § 1), restored the defense of usury "to a corporation, the principal asset of which shall be the ownership of a one or two family
dwelling" where the corporation was created within the six month period preceding
execution
of the loan in question. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 374.2.
2
E.g., Dodd v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1962); Hagist Ranch, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 295 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. State-Admas Corp., 283
F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960); Nelson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1960); Wattley
v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1960); Skarda v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429
(10th Cir. 1957). See generally 7 MEaTNS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 38.07-.15
(rev. ed. 1956).
23819 U.S. 436 (1943).
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created for no substantial business purpose, and in fact did not func24
tion as an independent business organization.
Paymer v. Commissioner25 illustrates the practical difficulty in
making such a showing. In this case the court found that one of
two corporations formed by the taxpayers had been completely passive, having no business purpose and in fact engaging in no business
activity. It was held that the income derived from property held
by this corporation was taxable only to the shareholders. 26 However, the shareholders had accepted and secured a loan in the name
of the other corporation. That single corporate act was held sufficient business activity to justify a holding that the income in question was taxable to that corporation. 27 In general, the necessary
lack of business activity and purpose has been found only where the
corporation has merely held legal title to property transferred to
it, the shareholders retaining in fact and in form all incidents of
28
ownership.
2

"Whether the purpose be to gain some advantage under the law of the state...
or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business
activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity." Id. at 438-39.
- 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945). Real property held by a partnership was transferred to two corporations to hinder one of the partner's creditors; the partners continued to treat the property as partnership property. The Commissioner attempted
to tax the corporations on the income from the property over the contention of the
partners that the corporate entities should be disregarded and the income treated from
its inception as the partner's income. Id. at 335-36.
20150 F.2d at 337.
27 Id. at 336-37. Accord, Sheldon Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 835 (7th
Cir. 1941). Other courts have agreed that very slight business activity will be sufficient to require the corporation to be sustained as a separate taxable entity. In
Commissioner v. State-Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), a corporation formed
for the purpose of holding title to trust property and avoiding anticipated difficulties
on the death of the sole trustee and income beneficiary was sustained as a separate
entity. The corporation had merely taken an assignment of a lease on the property
and executed a note to the trustee at an interest rate equal to the rental value of the
property. The court in Gray Holding Corp. v. Clauson, 95 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Me.
1951) upheld the entity where there had been no business activity, but where the
corporation had the privilege under its charter of engaging in business. "[P]laintiff's
broad though unexercised, corporate powers are alone sufficient to subject plaintiff
to the corporate income tax .... ." Id. at 935.
2-1Jackson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Brager
Bldg. & Land Corp., 124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941); North Jersey Title Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 84 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1936); 112 W. 59th St. Corp. v. Helvering, 68
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1933). One author argues that failure to discover any business
activity has been equated with the existence of an agency relationship between the
shareholder and the corporation; the income is then taxed only to the shareholder
on the grounds that income collected by an agent for his principal in the scope of
his agency belongs to the principal. BiTrKER, FEDERAL INco E TAXATION oF CoR-
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Courts have indicated a similar reluctance to disregard the corporate entity in other types of tax litigation. Attempts to avoid
state sales taxes assessed on transfers between a parent corporation
and its closely held subsidiary, on the ground that the subsidiary was
really only a department or agent of the parent, have almost uniformly been frustrated.29 There has also been a general refusal to
disregard the corporate entity to allow the shareholder to escape
state levies for unemployment compensation. 0 In all the above
cases the courts have been unwilling to disregard the entity where
the shareholder has utilized the corporation's status as a separate
entity for a substantial period and has enjoyed the economic advantages that result from conducting business in the corporate form.
The shareholder cannot reasonably complain that the courts
have taken an unduly rigid view of the corporate entity in imposing
tax liability. While the average businessman may be unable to
anticipate many of the legal ramifications of the separate corporate
entity, certainly the tax burdens are notorious and foreseeable. His
voluntary creation and use of the corporation has been deemed, in
effect, acceptance by him of these burdens as a cost of doing business
in the corporate form. The shareholder has been denied only what
he had no right to expect: the benefits of the corporate form without
its burdens.
PROTECTION oF THIRD PARTIES

Though the shareholder has convinced the court that as between
himself and his adversary there is no barrier to disregarding the
corporate entity, nevertheless third party interests may intervene
and induce the court to insist that the entity be maintained. As the
discussion below indicates, courts have been most sensitive to threats
to third party interests in cases involving shareholder attempts to
make personal use of corporate assets.
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS §2.08 (1959). See National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
-" Des Moines 9- Cent. Iowa Ry. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 115 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa
1962); Washington Sav-Mor Oil Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 58 Wash. 2d 518, 364 P.2d 440
(1961); Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Fin., 377 I1. 282, 36 N.E.2d 354 (1941).
But cf. Valier Coal Co. v. Department of Revenue, 11 Ill. 2d 402, 143 N.E.2d 35 (1957);
Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. State Board of Equilization, 21 Cal.2d 524, 133 P.2d 400
(1943).
'°Eastwood Model Mkt. v. State, 359 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); BellLourim Elec. Supply Co. v. Employment Security Comm'n, 346 Mich. 627, 78 N.W.2d
575 (1956). Cf., Bonnar-Vawter, Inc. v. Johnson, 157 Me. 380, 173 A.2d 141 (1961)

(state use tax).
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Shareholder Recovery on a Corporate Cause of Action
A shareholder may not successfully assert a corporate cause of
action in a suit brought in his own name and for his exclusive benefit.31 In refusing to disregard the entity and to recognize a personal
cause of action, the courts have insured that recovery will be sought
by the corporation itself or by the shareholders in a derivative capacity. Either of these latter two methods of asserting corporate
claims protects innocent shareholders and corporate creditors since
32
the recovery inures to the corporate treasury.
However, under special circumstances a few courts have bypassed the corporate treasury and divided the recovery in a derivative action pro rata among selected shareholders of the corporation.
For instance, in Perlman v. Feldmann, 3 where the derivative action
was based on alleged breach of fiduciary duty by corporate management and majority shareholders, the court allowed minority shareholders to recover individually. It was emphasized that recovery
by the corporation would have restored the funds recovered to the
control of the wrongdoers. 34 Similarly, in Chounes v. Laing,35
another case involving alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the court
awarded pro rata recovery to limit recovery to innocent shareholders.
As in the Perlman case, corporate recovery was not needed to protect corporate creditors, and the court was unwilling to benefit shareholders who had acquiesced in the alleged wrongs. 36 Thus courts
have indicated a willingness to grant an extraordinary remedy where
33Brictson v. Woodrough, 164 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1947); Green v. Victor Talking
Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 602 (1928); November v.
National Exhibition Co., 10 Misc. 2d 537, 173 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1958); All States
Warehousing, Inc. v. Mammoth Storage Warehouses, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 714, 180
N.Y.S.2d 118 (1958); Ruplinger v. Ruplinger, 154 Neb. 394, 48 N.W.2d 73 (1951).
See 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 317 (1935).
'2 See E. M. Fleischmann Lumber Corp. v. Resources Corp. Int'l, 105 F. Supp. 681
(D. Del. 1952); London v. Bruskas, 64 N.M. 73, 324 P.2d 424 (1958); Massachusetts
v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 168 S.W.2d 216 (1942), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 210 (1943). Courts
have also sought to avoid the "multiplicity of suits" which would result if each shareholder had a cause of action for each single wrong suffered by his corporation. Waller
v. Waller, 187 Md. 185, 49 A.2d 449 (1946). See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 43 (rev.
ed. 1946). Further, recovery by the corporation may also be necessary to insure payment of the corporation's tax liabilities. See Licken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 411
(N.D. Iowa 1946).
3219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
3"Accord Young v. Columbian Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931); Brown
v. DeYoung, 167 IlL. 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897).
"g125 W. Va. 275, 23 S.E.2d 628 (1942).
SGAccord, Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927); Dill v. Johnston, 72
Okla. 149, 179 Pac. 608 (1919); Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R.I. 146, 31 At. 1058 (1895);
Fougeray v. Cord, 50 N.J. Eq. 185, 24 At. 499 (1892).
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the third party interests normally thought to bar individual recovery
37
either do not exist or are not worthy of protection.
Debt Set-Oifs
Fear of injury to third parties has resulted in refusal to disregard
the corporate entity for the benefit of shareholders in suits involving
attempted debt set-offs. Plaintiffs, in Dennis v. Smith, 8 held stock
in a corporation which had a deposit in an insolvent bank. Suit
was brought to compel the receiver of the bank to apply the corporation's deposit against the shareholder's personal liability to the
bank. Generally, one claim will not offset another unless each is
owned by a party to the suit. 39 To overcome this hurdle the shareholder urged that the separate entity of the corporation should be
ignored so that they could be viewed as creditors of the bank. The
court refused on the grounds that the set-off would amount to an
improper use of corporate assets; such assets, the court noted, are
properly used to carry on corporate business to benefit all share40
holders and to secure corporate creditors.
Other courts in dealing with attempted set-offs against insolvent
banks have refused to disregard the entity on the grounds that the
set-off would be prejudicial to creditors of the bank.4 1 Such set-offs
would amount to a preference in favor of the particular depositor,
and, to whatever degree the set-off satisfied the shareholder's obligation to the bank, the pool of assets available to meet the claims of
other depositors would be reduced.
There is a similar line of cases involving suits instituted by a
solvent plaintiff against a defendant who happens to hold stock in
a corporation to which plaintiff is in debt. Here too the courts have
refused to reduce the shareholder's liability by allowing him to setoff the corporation's claim where such set-off might prejudice credi37 See Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 105, 6 A.2d 519 (1939); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187,
189 Ad. 320 (1937). Cf., May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 668 (1941). See generally Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1314 (1956).
3s 49 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
80Id. at 910. See Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 54 N.W. 1115
(1893).

BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 133

(rev. ed. 1946).

49 S.W.2d at 910. See generally, Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study
of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. Ray. 1373, 1394 (1938).
'Feucht v. Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 105 Ind. App. 405, 12 N.E.2d 1019 (1938);
4
40

State v. Weston Bank, 125 Neb. 612, 251 N.W. 164 (1933). Contra, Black & Decker
Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 53 Ohio App. 356, 4 N.E.2d 929 (1936). Cf. Gallagher
v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 54 N.W. 1115 (1893).
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tors of his corporation. 42 However, where no corporate creditors
43
were threatened, set-off has been allowed.
From the shareholder's point of view, the refusal to sanction
set-off here is not as serious as it was where the plaintiff was insolvent; the shareholder can institute a new suit in the name of the
corporation, and, since the plaintiff is solvent, recover the debt.
However, in this context the refusal to disregard the entity is open
to the objection that it promotes circuity of action. In addition,
in an occasional case, the shareholder might find that the statute
of limitations had run on the corporation's claim.44 These considerations make it important that the court ascertain that, in fact,
third party interests would be prejudiced by the set-off before refusing to disregard the entity.
Testamentary Dispositions of CorporateProperty
Courts have been willing under some circumstances to allow
nominally corporate property to pass under a shareholder's will.
The cases in which the devise has been upheld have involved close
corporations created by the testator solely for the convenience of
holding title to his property, the testator during his life having
treated the property in question as though it were his own. Generally these corporations have had no creditors at the testator's
death.45 Where that was not the case, the devise was upheld on a
showing that the corporation had sufficient assets to satisfy the claims
46
of its creditors over and above the corporate assets bequeathed.
Here again the courts have disregarded the corporate entity at the
42 McLendon v. Galloway, 216 Ga. 261, 116 S.E.2d 208 (1960); Knight v. Burns, 220
Ohio App. 482, 154 N.E. 345 (1926); Erickson v. Revere Elevator Co., 110 Minn. 443,
126 N.W. 130 (1910); Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., supra note 41.
43 Lerner v. Stone, 126 Colo. 589, 252 P.2d 533 (1952); Hoaglund v. Liter, 308 Ky.
680, 215 S.W.2d 583 (1948); United States Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wall Plaster Co., 60
Mont. 132, 199 Pac. 249 (1921); State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle
Co., 30 N.M. 566, 240 Pac. 469 (1925).
"1Compare Wolf v. S. H. Wintman Co., 87 R.I. 156, 139 A.2d 84 (1958) with Wolf
v. S. H. Wintman Co., 161 A.2d 411 (R.I. 1960).
"'In the Matter of the Will of Stukalo, 7 Misc. 2d 1042, 166 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sur.
Ct. 1957); In the Matter of the Will of Bauer, 289 N.Y. 326, 45 N.E.2d 897 (1942);
In the Matter of the Estate of Turley, 160 Misc. 190, 289 N.Y. Supp. 704 (Sur. Ct.
1936); In the Matter of the Estate of Buch, 124 Misc. 674, 209 N.Y. Supp. 776 (Surn.
Ct. 1925). Contra, Crane v. Horton, 287 Mass. 160, 191 N.E. 391 (1934). See Fuller,
supra note 36, at 1397.
10 In the Matter of the Will of Winburn, 136 Misc. 19, 240 N.Y. Supp. 208 (Surr.
Ct. 1930).
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behest of the shareholder where no prejudice would result to third
47
parties.
CONCLUSION

A court may be induced to disregard the corporate entity by a
shareholder who can establish that no one would be unfairly prejudiced by the relief he seeks. Initially the shareholder must show that
it is necessary to disregard the corporate entity to properly adjust
the equities between himself and his adversary. Courts have been
satisfied on this point with a showing that the shareholder's opponent has manipulated a corporate entity to avoid a contractual
obligation or a statutory restriction. Further, since interests not
represented or protected by parties to the suit may be adversely
affected where the entity is disregarded, courts have also required
the shareholder to establish that no third parties would be prejudiced. If refusal would seriously prejudice the shareholder, the
court should examine the facts closely to determine that there would
be actual injury to third party interests before refusing on that
ground to disregard the entity for the benefit of the shareholder.
Even where such interests are actually threatened, the courts might,
as one commentator has suggested, disregard the entity while protecting those interests with other available procedures. 48
'7The fact that a legatee may be injured by the disregard has not caused the
courts to refuse to pierce the veil. In the Matter of Barries' Estate, 25 Misc. 2d 890,
203 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Surr. Ct. 1960) where testator bequeathed all of the stock of his
corporation to named legatees subject to a $300 per month payment to his widow,
payable from the rental income from property held by the corporation, the fact that
the payment diminished the value of the stock did not prevent disregard of the entity.
See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry, 160 Tenn. 57, 22 S.W.2d 6 (1929).
," Berger suggests that a court of equity could allow the shareholders to recover
on the conditions that they accept liability for the claims of such third parties; or,
the court might abate the judgment until creditors have been notified and given a
chance to file claims with the court. Berger, "Disregarding the Corporate Entity"
for Stockholders' Benefit, 55 CoLuMr. L. REv. 808, 823 (1955). He also suggests that a
class action by the shareholders for their own benefit would avoid the "multiplicity
of suits" problem. Id. at 822.

